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NARRATIVES AND COUNTERNARRATIVES:  
SOMALI-CANADIANS ON RECRUITMENT AS FOREIGN 
FIGHTERS TO AL-SHABAAB 
Paul Joosse*, Sandra M. Bucerius and Sara K. Thompson 
Recently, the Somali diaspora has found itself at the centre of heightened security concerns sur-
rounding the proliferation of international terrorist networks and their recruitment strategies. 
These concerns have reached new levels since the absorption of al-Shabaab into al-Qaeda in 2012. 
Based on a qualitative analysis of interviews with 118 members of Canada’s largest Somali com-
munity, this article draws upon narrative criminology to reverse the ‘why they joined’ question 
that serves as the predicate for much recent radicalization scholarship, and instead explores, ‘why 
they would never join’. We encounter Somali-Canadians equipping themselves with sophisticated 
counternarratives that vitiate the enticements of al-Shabaab. Particularly, notions of ‘coolness’, 
‘trickery’ and ‘religious perversion’ mediate participants’ perceptions of al-Shabaab and enable a 
self-empowering rejection of its recruitment narratives. In particular, we find resonances between 
the narratives of non-recruits and ‘bogeyman’ narratives that exist commonly in many cultures. 
The efficacy of these narratives for resilience is three-fold, positioning the recruiters as odious 
agents, recruits as weak-minded dupes and our participants as knowledgeable storytellers who can 
forewarn others against recruitment to al-Shabaab.
Keywords: foreign fighters, radicalization, narrative criminology, resilience, diasporas, 
violence, al-shabaab, al-Qaeda
Introduction 
Recent years have seen an increasing number of scholars agree that the study of terror-
ism does and should fall under the purview of criminological inquiry (Rosenfeld 2002; 
2004; LaFree and Hendrickson 2007), including that which examines radicalization 
leading to violence. To date, however, the literature on radicalization is dominated by 
a focus on identifying the often interactive processes through which individual actors 
become radicalized (Silke 2008; Hamm 2009; Useem and Clayton 2009; Berko et al. 
2010; Treadwell and Garland 2011; Bouhana 2013). To be sure, the emphasis on risk 
that characterizes terrorism to date (both within and outside of criminology) is nec-
essary and important. However, as a large and interdisciplinary literature on violent 
crime more generally has demonstrated, there is also much to be learned by examin-
ing the factors that render people resilient to so-called criminogenic forces (see e.g. 
Richman and Fraser 2001; Aisenberg and Herrenkohl 2008; Martinez-Torteya et  al. 
2009; Howell et al. 2010).
A new subfield within criminology—namely, narrative criminology—has emerged to 
provide valuable tools for understanding criminal involvement (Presser and Sandberg 
*Paul Joosse and Sandra M. Bucerius, Department of Sociology, 5–21 Tory Building, University of Alberta, Edmonton, AB T6G 
2H4, Canada; jjoosse@ualberta.ca; Sara K. Thompson, Department of Criminal Justice and Criminology, Ryerson University, 
350 Victoria Street, JOR 832 Toronto, Ontario M5B 2K3, Canada. 
doi:10.1093/bjc/azu103 BRIT. J. CRIMINOL. (2015) 55, 811–832
Advance Access publication 6 March 2015
811
 at U
niversity of H
ong K
ong on A
ugust 29, 2016
http://bjc.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
forthcoming; Presser 2009; 2012; Sandberg 2010; 2013) and—we propose—resistance 
to involvement in terrorism. Narrative criminology explores the ways that ‘people estab-
lish who they are—their identity work—by emplotting their experience’ into narratives 
(Presser 2012: 6). Attention to narrative has been a mainstay across many disciplines, 
from history, to literature, to psychology and to anthropology, and while narrative 
criminology derives from these diverse traditions (Presser 2009), it is distinguished by 
a commitment to an analysis of the ways in which narratives themselves are constitutive 
antecedents of crime. Constructionist in nature, narrative criminology conceives of 
narratives as an ‘ontological condition of social life’ and pushes discursive analysis to the 
forefront of concern (Somers 1994, cited in Presser 2009: 184), rather than dwelling 
on Cartesian dualisms implicit in deliberations about the extent to which narratives 
are artful impositions of subjectivities onto ‘real’ events, or analyses of how narratives 
neutralize what is ‘actually’ morally suspect behaviour.
Such a non-positivist orientation promises a number of benefits when applied to terrorism 
studies. First, it can imbue analyses with a sensitivity to some of the problems of normativ-
ity that have plagued the field thus far (Tilly 2004; Jackson 2007). Indeed, one might revise 
an oft-repeated (to the point of becoming clichéd) axiom to read ‘one person’s terrorist is 
another person’s freedom fighter—depending on one’s story’. Further, the narrative gaze may 
open up opportunities for challenging the balkanized division between terrorological and 
criminological spheres. Sandberg et al. (2014), e.g. analyzed Anders Breivik’s bombing/shoot-
ing campaign (a prima facie terrorist attack)1 in terms of the cultural script of school shootings. 
Second, although jurisprudential concepts like mens rea have tended to locate criminological 
concern within the horizon of the individual, narrative criminology works toward more col-
lectivist insights as ‘stories thematize the points of connection between personal and collec-
tive experience’ (Presser 2009: 178–9). Turning again to the example of Breivik, we see that 
although his Manifesto contains strivings toward a unified and coherent individual narrative, 
these strivings are also inflected by a diverse array of influences that belie such unity while 
implicating wider social movements (Sandberg 2013; Berntzen and Sandberg 2014). Fourth 
and finally (and most important for present purposes), narrative criminology paves an avenue 
for investigating the self-stories of those who have never seriously considered engaging in 
criminal activity personally. Participation or non-participation in ‘foreign fighter’ campaigns, 
e.g. is a phenomenon that can be expected to draw heavily on a narrative imaginary as such 
activity would involve dramatic, transformational changes in the lives of potential participants.
A narrative criminology would also find direct relevance to questions central to ter-
rorism studies proper. Among the many disadvantages that terrorist organizations face 
in contexts of asymmetrical warfare, recruitment stands out among the most pressing. 
In contrast to the state, which enjoys vast conscriptive or otherwise persuasive powers, 
terrorist groups, threatened by expanding strategies of surveillance and interdiction, 
often must eschew organized or ‘top-down’ recruitment strategies (Arquilla et al. 1999; 
Tucker 2001: 1–3; Hoffman 2006: 39–40, 267–72; Sageman 2008; Neumann 2009: 17–21, 
56–68), and instead rely on ‘supply side’ vectors for mobilization and recruitment.2 This 
1 On 22 July 2011, Anders Breivik conducted a dual attack, first car-bombing government buildings in Oslo, killing eight, then 
travelling to the island of Utoya where he shot 69 people, most of whom were youth members of the Norway’s Labour Party. He has 
been widely regarded as an archetypal example of a ‘lone wolf terrorist’ (Pantucci 2011; Spaaij 2012; Berntzen and Sandberg 2014).
2 Marc Sageman makes an apt, if unconventional, comparison to illustrate these ‘supply side’ vectors. Like Harvard, al-Qaeda 
[does] not have to recruit. People want to go to Harvard because of its reputation and the rewards a degree from the school 
brings. Likewise, some young Muslims want to join al-Qaeda because of its reputation (Sageman 2008: 70).
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has taken the form of pre-existing friendship or kinship networks (Della Porta 1988), 
the Internet-mediated self-affiliation of ‘wannabes’ who travel to join terrorist causes or 
strike out as lone-actors (Joosse 2007; 2015; Michael 2010; Gruenewald et al. 2013) and 
voluntarism from far-flung diaspora communities (Sheffer 2006; Hoffman et al. 2007). 
In this arrangement, terrorist ‘brands’ take on a much greater importance (Zelinsky 
and Shubik 2009), as do ‘hearts and minds’ campaigns (Crelinsten 2009: 135–57).
In response to this situation, a growing body of research has begun to devise meth-
ods of constructing counternarratives to radicalizing terrorist propaganda (Leuprecht 
et al. 2009; 2010; Payne 2009; Quiggin 2010). Zelinsky and Shubik (2009), e.g. advocate 
targeting groups’ ‘titular leadership to decrease the message-sending capabilities of 
the organization’ (Zelinsky and Shubik 2009: 6). Ashour (2011; see also Jacobson 2010) 
suggest that the best way to learn about devising counternarratives is to consult actual 
former terrorists, maintaining that, ‘[t]he current moment is unique; for the first time 
in the history of Jihadism we are provided with a “critical mass” of former militants who 
rebelled, not only against the current jihadists’ behaviour but also against the ideology 
that motivates them’ (e-text, no page numbers).
In addition to targeting individuals with messaging strategies, larger communal con-
texts have also increasingly made their appearance in recent conceptualizations of the 
radicalization process. In particular, we have seen the development of a host of radicali-
zation theories which position ‘terrorists’ as only the apex of a much broader pyrami-
dal structure (see McCauley and Moskalenko 2008: 416–7; 2011; Leuprecht et al. 2009; 
2010). In such models, the pyramid runs from the largest level at the bottom, consisting 
of those who are neutrally oriented to the terrorist narrative, to subsequent levels, each 
with diminishing numbers, from sympathizers, to supporters and finally, to terrorists 
themselves. Though different in certain respects, this relationship between diminishing 
numbers and progressing radicalization is evident in Moghaddam’s (2005) ‘narrowing 
staircase’ model of radicalization and Halafoff and Wright-Neville’s (2009) ‘social exclu-
sion’ model in which radicalizing individuals find themselves increasingly alienated 
from their supporting communities as they move towards terrorist deployment. 
These models seek to contextualize terrorists within a wider set of ideological predis-
positions and the broader communities out of which they arise. Insofar as they stress a 
relationship of ‘the many to the few’, they bring a much needed corrective to terrorism 
scholarship, which tends to focus only on ‘the few’—that is, those individuals who actu-
ally carry out attacks—while ignoring those who ascend only partway up the pyramid, 
or those (much greater in number) who never even begin an ascent. For example, 
Leuprecht et  al. encouraged what they call ‘bottom up’ approaches to constructing 
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counternarratives that might promote de-radicalization (Leuprecht et al. 2010: 53–5) 
and Halafoff and Wright-Neville write of a 
need to avoid the temptation to perceive counterterrorism as a largely reactive exercise that involves little 
more than detecting and hunting down those who have already crossed the violence threshold. (2009: 928)
These authors argue that we need to build ‘counterterrorism strategies that rob the 
terrorists of their narrative and symbolic power’ (2009: 927), thus addressing radicali-
zation earlier on in the process.
On the counterterrorism side, strategists seem to have been slow to recognize the 
importance of narrative. According to Alberto Fernandez, coordinator of the US 
State Department’s Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications, terrorist 
organizations have been ‘setting the narrative’, enjoying ‘a free shot at the audience for 
radicalizing people’ (quoted in Schmitt 2013). In response, in late 2013, Fernandez’s 
organization pioneered its ‘Think again. Turn away’ campaign, which distributes mes-
sages online, aiming to dissuade members of the English-speaking world from join-
ing Jihadist causes in Syria and al-Qaeda’s branches in Yemen (AQAP) and Somalia 
(al-Shabaab, Schmitt 2013). Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and ISIS’s global call for participa-
tion in the current attempt to restore the Caliphate through the obliteration of the 
Sykes-Picot borders speaks to the continued importance of story for mobilization (see 
countering efforts at https://twitter.com/ThinkAgain_DOS).
Our contention, however, is that the above pyramidal models—as currently formu-
lated—leave little room for a recognition of the agency of non-radicalized or pre-rad-
icalized populations. The danger of this ‘negative space’ of non-recognition is that it 
can homogenize populations from which recruitment occurs and position them as 
passive and ‘at risk’—vulnerable to the wiles of propagandists—that is, unless they 
are pre-emptively interdicted by powerful counterframes developed by experts in the 
counterterrorism field. In Leuprecht et  al.’s 2010 dual-pyramid model, e.g. the bot-
tom levels are considered ‘neutral’ (in their ‘narrative pyramid’) and ‘inert’ (in their 
‘action pyramid’). This arrangement seems to foreclose the possibility that people at 
the lower reaches of the pyramidal structure (or anywhere on it, for that matter) may 
not be just ‘neutral’ or ‘inert’ but rather that they may be staunchly opposed to the 
group, and have well-defined, counter-radicalizing narratives already in place.
Indeed, this is to be expected. Social movement scholars, particularly those from the 
framing tradition, have long known that frames and counterframes develop as a matter 
of course within the dialectic of movement-countermovement interaction (Zald and 
Useem 1987; Gamson 1992; Peckham 1998; Benford and Snow 2000: 625–7; Rohlinger 
2002; Joosse 2012a; 2015). McCauley and Moskalenko, to their credit, also note that rad-
icalization is predominantly a reactive process, and that ‘[t]he same mechanisms moving 
people toward radicalization and terrorism will operate as well in those who react to 
radicals and terrorists’ (2008: 430).
In this paper, we argue that the most powerful counternarratives that work against 
radicalization will already be in place within communities, reacting against the ideolo-
gies and radicalization strategies of terrorist movements. In short, we find that com-
munities—in this case the Somali-Canadian community—are involved in a narrative 
dialectic with the activities of al-Qaeda affiliate al-Shabaab, and as such it has already 
developed narrative tools that render it largely resistant to the radicalization process. 
To account for this situation, our data would be best rendered in this way: 
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Drawing on interviews with Somali young adults in Toronto, Canada, we argue that com-
munity dynamics can play a key role in generating and transmitting counternarratives 
to terrorist recruitment. Rather than taking the traditional tack on radicalization, which 
seeks to understand why particular terrorists became radicalized, our goal is thus to per-
form an exploratory shift of the question. In lineage with Travis Hirschi, we explore why 
so many Somali-Canadian youth are not attracted to the Somali group al-Shabaab, and 
how, specifically, their counternarratives work to vitiate the enticements proffered by the 
group. Further, we make the case that counterterrorism strategists, insofar as they are 
informed by the pyramidal models described above, risk missing out on taking advan-
tage of these pre-made tools when they seek to ‘go it alone’ with respect to developing 
countermessages. Based on our findings, we predict that communal input will be key to 
designing effective counternarratives. Although narrative criminology has remained pri-
marily focused on the criminogenic nature of narratives—that is, how narratives are ante-
cedent to crime (Presser 2012; 2014)—important peace-fostering extensions are possible. 
Shadd Maruna (2001), e.g. showed the importance of narratives (in this case, ‘redemption 
scripts’) to desistance among those with extensive histories of drug and property offences. 
Further directions suggest that narratives may be ‘peace- or desistance-promoting’ (Presser 
and Sandberg, forthcoming: 1, emphasis added). Our study, which seeks out and tries to 
understand the self-narratives of those who have never participated in crime, thus seeks to 
make a third extension, drawing further on the promise of narrative criminology.
We proceed in four sections. First, we provide an overview of our study and meth-
ods. Second, we perform a comparative analysis of the al-Shabaab recruitment narrative 
with counternarratives that have already been developed or are developing among the 
Somali-Canadian diaspora in Toronto. Third, we develop the concept of ‘genre’ (Presser 
and Sandberg, forthcoming: 14–6) to describe the al-Shabaab counternarrative in terms 
of a ‘bogeyman’ mythology, which shapes participants’ understanding of their relation-
ship to groups like al-Shabaab in terms of a self-empowering rejection. Fourth and finally, 
we discuss the importance of alliances between researchers and communities for maxi-
mizing the efficacy of counternarratives for preventing radicalization.
The Current Study: Context and Methodology
We approached these questions by conducting 118 semi-structured, in-depth inter-
views with 16–30-year-old members of the Somali-Canadian diaspora in the Greater 
Toronto Area (GTA). The Somali diaspora in Canada has received much negative media 
attention in recent years because a disproportionate number of young Somali males 
have died in homicides (thought to be drug- and/or gang-related) and more recently, 
a small handful of young Somali-Canadians have left Canada to join al-Shabaab. As a 
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consequence, Somali-Canadian’s perceive themselves to be a highly stigmatized group 
beset with ‘three strikes’ against them: as newcomers and refugees, as blacks and as 
Muslims. Indeed, one of our participants pointed out that: ‘Somalis are widely viewed as 
the lowest of the low in terms of immigrant groups, even within the broader Black com-
munity; we are the new Jamaicans’ (female, 21).
The Somali diaspora in Canada is estimated to have 150,000 members, with Toronto 
being home to the largest community. The great majority of Somali-Canadians immi-
grated to Canada in the early 1990s, following the civil unrest and political instability in 
Somalia. The community is thought to be heavily fragmented by clan divisions even today, 
making research in the community particularly difficult. To achieve a broader sense of the 
Somali diaspora, we had to ensure to recruit people from different clans into the study.
Each of our interviews consisted of 71 questions, covering personal background and 
immigration information and integration experiences, experiences with Canadian 
institutions and mainstream society, family dynamics and gender roles, religious atti-
tudes, crime and violence in the Somali community and, finally, al-Shabaab. The aver-
age interview length was 45 minutes, with our shortest interview being 16 minutes long 
and our longest interview being 1 hour and 45 minutes long. We designed our interview 
instrument in continuous consultation and collaboration with our Somali research 
assistants to ensure that our questions were culturally appropriate and meaningful.
Collectively, we have a wealth of experience conducting research in contexts of dif-
ference. Our methodological considerations with respect to building rapport and inter-
viewing in the Somali community developed out of our experiences researching and 
building rapport with other diverse groups (Joosse 2012b; 2015; Bucerius 2013; 2014; 
Thompson et al. 2013). As a consequence, our research team was diverse; some of our 
interviewers were Somali-Canadians with strong connections in the Somali community 
in Toronto, and others were undergraduate and graduate students of non-Somali back-
ground. Shah (2004: 556–64) examined the insider/outsider dynamic that pervades all 
cross-cultural research and argued that insiders can be expected to have a wide range of 
advantages when seeking to access meaning from participants. Although we are sensitive 
to this issue, others point to the fact that both sides of the insider/outsider dichotomy 
experience advantages and disadvantages pertaining to their particular subject posi-
tions (for a recent discussion, see Zempi and Chakraborti 2014: 41–7). More specifi-
cally, and in line with Bucerius’ (2013) work on ‘trusted outsiders’, a research team that 
includes members of outsider status may offer a different perspective and gather dif-
ferent data than would be captured by those of insider status alone. By working with 
a mixed team of research assistants with insider status (by virtue of belonging to the 
same ethnic and religious community) and those with outsider status (by virtue of not 
being ethnically Somali), we believe we accessed different perspectives and opened up 
different avenues for rapport. More importantly, we were able to capitalize on both: the 
advantages associated with ‘insider research’ as well as the advantages associated with 
‘outsider research’ (Bucerius 2015). Indeed, although we acknowledge that the concept 
of verstehen has a long and controversial history in the social sciences (Shields 1996), 
we nevertheless believe that intercultural research3 is possible, not in terms of access-
ing a ‘truth’ that resides in the ‘other’, but rather via dialogical interactions between 
3 This presumption is also necessary for the communicative act of writing about research (Spalek 2005: 414–6) and the dis-
semination of research findings to an audience, which is itself characterized by cultural polyphony.
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the researcher and research participant that produce intersubjective syntheses of mean-
ing (Bahktin 1973). These processes of synthesis develop over time, and they can only 
develop amidst a reflexive sensitivity to the power dynamics that would otherwise lead 
to the imposition and recapitulation of the researchers’ narratives in the interview and 
analysis settings. This is a ‘tricky’ process, as even attempts to establish rapport and be 
empathic can lead to such impositions (e.g. see Spalek 2005).
Given these considerations, we made sure to spend as much time as possible incor-
porating cultural knowledge into our research method. We did this by researching the 
Somali community—both within and outside of Canada—extensively prior to field-
work, by consulting extensively with Somali-Canadian individuals and cultural organi-
zations on an ongoing basis as questions arose, and by diversifying our research team 
so as to include ‘insiders’. In addition to the inclusion of Somali-Canadians on our 
research team, our team was also comprised of both male and female research assis-
tants, and a majority of our interviewers on our research team were themselves from 
the age group that we were studying (16–30 year olds). We found that our data benefit-
ted from our diverse team and different researcher personalities (see also Bucerius 
2013). Ferrell (1998) pointed out that it would be a mistake to assume that status traits 
(as discussed by Hughes 1945) such as gender, ethnicity and sexual orientation are 
immaterial in research process. We, too, had the experience that different researcher 
personalities yielded different data and thus greatly enriched our overall data set.
To recruit participants into our study, we used a respondent-driven sampling method 
(RDS), allowing us to take advantage of intra-group social connections (Heckathorn 
1997). RDS has proven to be extremely useful in quickly recruiting large numbers of 
people from hidden, difficult to access populations. We initially planted four ‘seeds’ 
(initial interview participants) in geographically different areas in the GTA. By plant-
ing different seeds, we were able to ensure that we recruited community members from 
different clans. Each seed was permitted to recruit two new participants into the study 
(receiving $10 per referral) and each new referral could equally refer two new people. 
Although we tried to achieve an equal gender distribution, our sample consists of more 
males (n  =  68) than females (n  =  50). This is likely the case because our male par-
ticipants tended to recruit more often and tended to recruit their male peers, whereas 
our female participants did not necessarily recruit additional people. Additionally, we 
organized two mass interview sessions through community partners. Twenty-five inter-
views were conducted through this methodology.
Overall, recruitment happened over a time period of ten months (February to November 
2013). We believe the RDS method allowed us to recruit people into the study who were 
already familiar with the goals of the study (because they were referred by previous study 
participants), which made establishing rapport significantly easier. This was crucial given 
the sensitivity of some of our questions and the fact that the Somali community in Canada 
has received so much negative media attention, of which they are keenly aware.
In addition to our interviews with young Somali-Canadians, we also attended seven 
community events, interviewing 26 key stakeholders in the Somali Canadian commu-
nity in the GTA. These were stakeholders who were in charge of community organiza-
tions, NGOs, student-led initiatives and police liaison units that deal specifically with 
the Somali community. This approach allowed us to triangulate the data we collected 
from our participants with our own impressions at community events and the narra-
tives of stakeholders in the community.
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Through this process, we were able to identify a set of counterterrorist narratives 
related to al-Shabaab that were already in action within the Somali-Canadian diaspora. 
Before proceeding to an analysis of these counterframes, however, we will provide a 
brief background primer on al-Shabaab itself.
Al-Shabaab: A Case Study in International Terrorist Recruitment
A remnant youth wing of the Islamic Courts Union, which ruled much of southern 
Somalia until 2006, al-Shabaab has seen its influence and power diminish considerably 
in recent years. African Union forces from Uganda and Burundi managed to push the 
group out of the capital of Mogadishu in August 2011, and in September 2012, Kenyan 
and Somali forces launched an amphibious assault that led to the capture of the port 
town of Kismayo, a crucial conduit of revenue for the group, stemming from charcoal 
exports (Rembold et al. 2013).
Internal struggles within the organization suggest that this lack of success in the 
domestic theatre may be encouraging the development of a more global jihadist 
ideology. In 2012, the leadership’s bid for membership in al-Qaeda was accepted 
by Ayman al-Zawahiri, and there are suggestions that there has been a turn in 
the direction of the ‘far enemy’—striking at civilians of foreign nations that sup-
ply military support to al-Shabaab’s domestic enemies. By 2012, nearly a quarter 
of its attacks were occurring outside of Somalia in neighbouring Kenya, which 
is a major ally and military supporter of the Transitional National Government 
(START 2013: 1). The most notorious of these attacks was the Westgate mall attack 
of September 2013 through which al-Shabaab reached a globalized level of noto-
riety, becoming a central feature in the news cycles of international media. The 
United States designated the group a terrorist organization in 2008 and Canada 
followed suit in 2010.
But the group is internationalist in another sense as well—as a simple function of the 
fact that since the late 1980s, Somalia has become a ‘diasporised nation’ (Menkhaus 2009: 
10). In recent years, Somali-Canadians (and members of Somali diasporas elsewhere) 
have found themselves at the centre of heightened security concerns surrounding the 
proliferation of al-Shabaab’s international recruitment networks. In the Canadian con-
text, it is estimated that 20–25 young men in their 20s have left to join the organization, 
and it is believed that 40 US Americans are fighting alongside al-Shabaab (International 
Centre for the Study of Radicalization 2012). According to Shinn (2011), the 85 mem-
ber executive council includes 42 Somalis and 43 foreigners.4 The following section will 
explore the appeal of al-Shabaab to those few who have decided to join, by way of a 
framing strategy that invokes notions of glory, excitement and what Sageman (2008) has 
termed ‘Jihadi cool’.
Al-Shabaab’s Recruitment Frame: ‘cool, independent, youthful, warriors’ 
Olivier Roy suggests that second-generation Muslims in Western nations who face 
racism, social exclusion and loneliness on a daily basis may find that terrorist groups 
4 Shinn does not specify the percentage of the foreigners that have come from Somali diaspora communities.
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can offer ‘a valorizing substitute identity: members of the vanguard of internation-
alist jihadists who fight the global superpower and the international system’ (2006: 
309). Likewise, Cottee and Hayward (2011: 979)  suggest that terrorism might be a 
solution to an ‘existential frustration’ (a sense that ‘one’s life is meaningless, direc-
tionless, boring, banal, uneventful, anodyne, soulless, aimless, passive, cowardly’). 
Accordingly, terrorism can be attractive in the sense that it can offer excitement, 
meaning and glory (966). Nearly a third of our participants who offered a response 
to our question about why people would make the decision to join al-Shabaab invoked 
the glory/pride theme, often remarking that al-Shabaab recruits style themselves as 
pious and glorious religious warriors. Illustrative of this was one particularly eloquent 
participant who noted:
it’s immense pride …. a lot of time in the religion people are referred to as heroes and there’re so 
many hero stories … just the name that is used that’s shared, Mujahedeen, coming from the word 
Jihad, like this person is looked up to…. I’m just saying the credentials and the honour that’s given to 
that title. It’s like equivalent to like a samurai, what a samurai was in Japan, you know people would 
want to be that, and so it’s glorified (male, 21)
Another mentioned:
they wanna feel like they’re a martyr and they wanna feel like the stories during the Prophet’s time 
when there was something worth fighting for, when you were being attacked you know? And you were 
defending yourself, you know? (male, 22)
‘Coolness’ also seems to play a big role in the marketing of violent jihad to young 
Muslims. Jamie Bartlett and Carl Miller remark that ‘excitement, exotic landscapes, 
and guns’ carry a special cache for those contemplating joining an international ter-
rorist network (2012: 14–5). Marc Sageman also notes that ‘there is a “ jihadi cool” 
and “ jihadi talk” [which]…. makes jihad fun and interesting to young Muslims, who 
join global Islamist terrorism because it’s cool and thrilling to be part of a clandestine 
undertaking’ (2008: 159–60).
For present purposes, it is important to look more closely at the attributes of cool-
ness, however. Pountain and Robins’s (2000) cross-cultural analysis of what it means 
to be ‘cool’ finds that coolness is fundamentally a quality of independence, of setting 
your own rules in the fashion of a maverick. A crucial addition to this, however, is a 
non-chalance with regard to this maverick status: cool people are breaking rules (or 
setting their own), but in this process, they are comfortable, collected and express the 
attitude of ‘it’s no big deal’. According to Norman Mailer’s definition (which Pountain 
and Robins use, but which we reproduce at greater length below) to be cool is:
to be in control of a situation because you have swung where the Square has not…. To be cool is to 
be equipped, and if you are equipped it is more difficult for the next cat who comes along to put you 
down. And of course one can hardly afford to be put down too often, or one is beat, one has lost one’s 
confidence, one has lost one’s will, one is impotent in the world of action … indeed closer to dying. 
(Mailer 1957 [1992]: 352)
With this definition, it is easy to see that a young man who strikes out on his own, 
perhaps in defiance of his parents, to make his way to the horn of Africa for jihad, is 
enacting just such a role.
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True to the theme of coolness, al-Shabaab (which is Arabic for ‘the Youth’) employs a 
rebellious and playful framing strategy designed to appeal to young males in diaspora 
communities. In one al-Shabaab recruitment video, Muhammad Al-Amriki, an American 
who left Minneapolis in 2007, smiles at the camera and speaks directly to potential recruits 
in the diaspora: ‘if you guys only knew how much fun we have over here—this is the real 
Disneyland. You need to come here and join us’ (quoted in Brewer 2013). 
This youthful appeal also featured in the videos produced by Omar Hammami, a 
former University of Southern Alabama student who joined al-Shabaab in 2006 and 
quickly rose to become the face of al-Shabaab’s recruitment efforts in the diaspora. 
Not shy to accompany his videos with his own rap songs,5 Hammami’s usefulness to 
al-Shabaab came as no surprise to a former friend in the United States that Hammami 
had converted to Islam in high school:
If you look at it, it just seems that he is the right person for the job, you know they’re looking for 
someone who is like kinda cool, that relates to them, and they’re looking for someone who is hip, 
but at the same time someone like who knows a lot about the religion and is very passionate about it. 
(quoted in Putzel 2011)
Before departing for Somalia, Hammami spent a year in Toronto, married a woman 
from the local Somali community and formed a friendship network that would later 
lead others to follow him to the Horn of Africa (Goddard 2010). Hammami’s ex-wife 
also spoke to his ‘cool factor’: ‘He speaks like them, he knows what kind of music they 
like. He was a youth that grew up in the west, you know, like “he’s our guy”’ (quoted in 
Putzel 2011).6
Thus, from these few examples, we can see that al-Shabaab styles itself in a way that 
may very well appeal to second-generation Somalis who perhaps feel that they are lan-
guishing in the lower strata of the societies that they inhabit. It is as if recruiters, acting 
as the ‘cool older kid’, are extending a privileged invitation, and those who accept can 
expect religious commendation, glory, adventure and an aura of coolness will accrue to 
them after linking up with the Shabaab. Fundamentally, the coolness of this choice is 
dependent on the perceived independence of the choice—these are young, confident, 
rebels with a cause.
Participants’ Views on Recruitment to Al-Shabaab
The reality of the life of an international recruit to al-Shabaab would seem to be one 
that belies this notion of coolness-though-independence, however. As political scientist 
Ken Menkhaus writes:
a young diaspora recruit is, upon arrival in Somalia, entirely cut off socially and therefore in theory 
easier to isolate, indoctrinate, and control for the purpose of executing suicide bombings. Were this 
not the case, it would much less risky and less expensive for shabaab to simply recruit locals. From 
5 Hammami’s track Make Jihad with Me can be heard at http://www.wired.com/images_blogs/dangerroom/2011/04/Make_
Jihad_with_me.mp3. Interestingly, one of the only mildly sympathetic comments on al-Shabaab from our sample came in the 
form of a recapitulation of K’Naan’s (a world-famous Somali-Canadian hip hop star) views on the group.
6 Another source of al-Shabaab’s appeal to second-generation Somalis in the diaspora seems to stem from its rejection of clan-
based factionalism (Lederach et al. 2011: 24). Twenty-nine of our 118 respondents also expressed dissatisfaction with the clan 
system, expressing a pan-Somali ethnic identity and laying blame for Somalia’s troubled political climate with the clan system.
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this perspective, a young diaspora member who heeds the call by a recruiter to “ join the cause” of 
fighting to protect his nation and religion is not so much a terrorist as a pawn, exploited by the real 
terrorists, those who are unwilling themselves to die for their cause but who are happy to manipulate 
a vulnerable and isolated youth to blow himself up. (2009: 11–12)
In our interviews, we found many participants who shared this assessment. These par-
ticipants had counterframes that problematized the reputed cool, collected, independ-
ence of al-Shabaab recruits. This is first evident in a theme of trickery or brainwashing 
into terrorism.
Trickery or brainwashing into terrorism
The trickery theme manifested most poignantly in connection with the supposed 
irrevocability of the commitment to al-Shabaab. As one study participant warned, 
‘[O]nce you hop on the plane and you enter Somalia they grab you then like, you’re 
basically theirs so you can’t do nothing about that…. It basically changes, you know, 
like they take back their word’ (male, 16  years old). Another noted the trap-like 
nature of the al-Shabaab sales pitch: ‘[T]hey get into your head then once they take 
you to the plane and buy you a ticket you are basically theirs. You can’t do anything 
about it’ (male, 16  years old). Finally, one participant expressed concerns about 
recruiters ‘scamming them, taking their passport and forcing them to [do] suicide 
bombings I guess, so it’s a scam, the ones that I heard of around Canada’ (male, 
17 years old).
Instead of bald-faced deception, many other participants thought that the undue 
influence of al-Shabaab recruiters worked more insidiously, at the level of brainwash-
ing. As one participant commented:
I think it’s a cult really I don’t know what minds that you’re at to be brainwashed but it comes down 
to anything like if you are easily, if you meet the wrong person or the people and they easily motivate 
you, because, I mean, there are people that are very charming in a sense and like they, whatever 
they’re saying you actually believe because they’re so passionate about it, and like so driven about it, 
like you just want to believe. (male, 23 years old)
Another remarked that ‘you literally get so warped into it…. I get it when a person says 
‘you know, I’ve been brainwashed’ - and I really honestly, what makes anyone, you know, 
susceptible to being brainwashed? I don’t know’ (male, 23 years old). Finally, one partic-
ipant simply stated that, ‘Al Shabaab actually messes with their minds and controls their 
minds’ (male, 20). The anti-cult movement has long made use of the brainwashing 
trope to delegitimize alternative religious organizations that seek recruits from main-
stream society (Bromley and Shupe 1981: 92–100). The responses by our participants 
when invoking the brainwashing theme have to be understood as similarly delegitimiz-
ing in this context.
Although the idea of ‘trickery’ and ‘brainwashing’ places moral culpability on the 
recruiter, recruits themselves were not exempt from ridicule in the perspectives of our 
participants. Recruits were viewed as ‘weak minded’ (female, 29), ‘gullible’ (male, 23), 
‘ just like little kids’ (male, 19), ‘lack[ing] knowledge’ (female, 22) and without a ‘strong 
backbone’ (female, 22). Here, the youthfulness of recruits is not interpreted as ‘cool-
ness’, but rather it is seen a source of vulnerability:
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[…] what’s weaker than the mind of a kid? You know ‘cause like you’re just here you don’t know what 
you’re gonna do with your life, you don’t know anything…. And then, you know, [recruiters can] 
mold their mind. First you start off slow, you know you could never rush anybody to say go kill your-
self. (male, 23 years old)
Others, without prompting, began imagining themselves as giving advice to other 
youth who might contemplate joining al-Shabaab:
You grew up in Canada. You were eating McDonald’s. You don’t know how to fight, dude. You go there 
you’re gonna get shot, you’re not gonna help. As opposed to if you learn something, you study and 
you actually are able to better yourself, then you can go back there and help your people. (male, 23)
Another urged potential recruits to,
Have a bigger self-understanding of who you are. I mean, if you know who you are, nothing anyone 
can tell you can affect you. But people that don’t know who they are and are trying to find themselves 
amidst all this exclusionary societies that, you know, you might be living in…. These al-Shabaab 
maniacs—this is what they prey on. They prey on young, you know, students or kids that are fed up 
of their economic status, you know, things that they necessarily didn’t even try to work on when they 
were here, and they prey on these kids…. it’s sickening, you know? (male, 24 years old)
Thus, in contrast to the framing which styles joining al-Shabaab as a ‘cool’ endeavour 
performed by independently minded mavericks, our participants express the senti-
ment that ‘you may think you’re cool, but actually you’re a tool’. That is, recruits are 
seen not only as ‘uncool’ in the general sense, but also in the more specific sense that 
our participants depicted them as literally mindless instruments of someone else—the 
antithesis of the independence and non-chalant self-directedness described in the work 
of Pountain and Robins (2000) and Mailer (1957 [1992]). As one participant noted, 
al-Shabaab
[…] uses them as a mine, yeah exactly. So that’s the one thing that pisses me off, its why are they 
using you? Why don’t they blow themselves up if they’re going to paradise soon? (male, 23 years old)
There can be nothing more uncool than someone who lacks the mental capacity to 
know that he or she is being used, especially when used for such self-destructive, and 
(as we shall see in the next theme) profane purposes.
Religious bullshit
Religion also proved to be a major resource for our participants when it came to the 
construction of counterframes. When it came to our question, ‘What role does religion 
play in your daily life?’ 88% of participants who responded7 claimed that it played a 
major role. The counterframes we encountered therefore did not take the character 
of secular rebuttals against the Islamic nature of al-Shabaab. Quite the contrary, al-
Shabaab itself was frequently criticized for its secularity, its lack of facility with Islamic 
concepts and what participants perceived as its cynical use of Islam for recruiting pur-
poses. Almost without exception, the Somali-Canadian youth that we spoke with take 
7 All but two of our 118 participants responded to the question.
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the view that al-Shabaab has, through its actions, de-legitimized itself from a theologi-
cal standpoint.
Indeed, when we asked participants about al-Shabaab’s use of religion, the reaction 
was often one of frustration if not outright scorn. We title this theme religious bullshit 
because the term frequently arose when participants discussed the religious vector of 
recruitment and radicalization. To wit:
It could be they actually believe in the bullshit cause that these guys say. Like, they’re trying to use 
Jihad or whatever as an excuse but, killing people is not, you’re not, you can’t fight each other and 
call it “Jihad.” So, it’s just murder…. there’s different reasons why people do it. I can’t exactly say why, 
I just know it’s stupid. (male, 18)
Another participant commented on the activities of recruiters: ‘I guess they go to the 
Mosque and they just get like, I don’t know they just tell them some bullshit. Yeah, they 
just tell them do this on the name of God or whatever’ (male, 17). Finally, another 
respondent remarked that recruiters ‘[…] just tell them [potential recruits] ‘you’re 
gonna be more religious, blah, blah, blah’. And like, it’s all bullshit cause like half the 
stuff they do is not really in Islam’ (male, 19)
Participants also frequently used their own religious knowledge to rebut the claims 
and actions of al-Shabaab. As one participant explained:
it’s not like regular extremism where you just go extreme with the religion, but [instead] you add 
things that were never there before, and then you go extreme with that.… I used to be very active in 
my masjid. I would be there all the time, clean there all the time and then help establish programs 
and everything, but then I started noticing that the girls … they would take a Hadith and then they 
would misinterpret it. So like, they would take the premise of like you know, boys and girls not to be 
mixing, right?8 Which is true, but in certain circumstances. So they’d like be ‘okay, then it’s not okay 
to go to school,’ which doesn’t make sense, you know what I mean? (female, 22)
Respondents also pointed to al-Shabaab’s exploitation of religious guilt as a valu-
able motivator for recruitment. Crucially, the idea of ‘religious guilt’ was most often 
refracted through a dual-themed interpretive frame. Although our participants some-
times conceived of the ‘guilty status’ of recruits as something that is socially engineered 
by manipulative recruiters promulgating a facile or doctrinally ill-informed Islamic 
perspective, at other times, our participants would agree that the recruits indeed stood 
in need of atonement, even from the perspective of (what they viewed as) correct Islam. 
Reflective of this first aspect was a female participant, who noted:
I think religion is that one card that you can play, that can guilt trip people like you know everybody 
wants to attain heaven and … they want to do right by God kind of thing, so it’s easier to use religion 
to skew, it’s easy to use religion to kind of get into their heads and, you know, not make them but 
convince them that this is what they need to do. (female, 22)
Reflective of the second aspect was one participant, who noted,
there’s a little bit of guilt on like why they’re not that religious anymore or falling in and out of religi-
osity. And so and that, that helps with the push…. [I]f I felt really out of line and I really did believe 
8 The interviewee is possibly referring to Sahih Bukhari Volume 7, Book 62, Hadith # 159: ‘Allah’s Apostle said, “Beware of 
entering upon the ladies.” A man from the Ansar said, “Allah’s Apostle! What about Al-Hamu the in-laws of the wife (the broth-
ers of her husband or his nephews etc.)?” The Prophet replied: “The in-laws of the wife are death itself”’.
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in God, like I would feel the need to do a lot too, but I’m not going as far as saying extremism but... 
(male, 21)
Thus, although there are many dimensions to our participants’ views about the use and 
misuse of Islam for recruitment purposes, the strongest theme we found pertained to 
the lack of religious credibility on the part of al-Shabaab recruits and recruiters; the 
idea, in short, that al-Shabaab is ‘a small fringe group of religious nutjobs’ (male, 18). 
Our findings therefore echo those of other researchers who point to Islam9 as a source 
of resiliency against the recruitment strategies of militant groups like al-Shabaab 
(Johnston and Sampson 1995; Hoover 2004; Halafoff and Wright-Neville 2009).
Counternarrative: al-Shabaab as ‘bogeyman’
In the course of our research, we went into interviews with some trepidation about 
asking participants about the serious and often stigmatizing topic of recruitment to 
al-Shabaab. We broached the subject with care, but frequently we were surprised with 
the humour and candour with which our participants spoke. For example, take the fol-
lowing exchange about al-Shabaab recruitment:
A: Do you have the feeling that al Shabaab is actively recruiting new members here in Canada?
I: …me and my friends we joke about it like, ‘al-Shabaab!’
A: And what do you joke about when you joke about it?
I: Like, for real, like if we see someone and we’re running, ‘Oh al-Shabaab, ahhh!’ (laughs) and we 
have a weird sense of humour…. when you see like the videos they’re like running and like they’re 
holding guns and stuff and like you see twelve year old kids, we do the same thing but like we don’t 
do it we just joke about it. (male, 17)
In this particular exchange, and out of the sentiments expressed in the previous sec-
tions, we see the metaphor of the ‘bogeyman’ emerging as a narrative trope that seems 
particularly apt for describing the youthful diaspora’s comportment to al-Shabaab. In 
some senses, it would seem culturally inappropriate to impose a Western-sounding 
narrative structure on members of the Somali-Canadian diaspora, but as Presser and 
Sandberg describe, a growing subset of narrative criminology will involve asking ‘how 
stories before them compare with standard types of genres’ (forthcoming: 14). Indeed, 
as literary critic and cultural historian Marina Warner has shown in voluminous detail, 
the ‘bogeyman’ or ‘sack man’ is a nearly universal character in cultural lore, and it 
usually involves some sort of moralizing and motivating story in which symbols of inno-
cence (most frequently children) are stolen by an odious figure (‘bluebeards, ogres, 
child-snatchers…[and] other wandering and hungry spirits’) and led away, either to 
live out an indentured, slave-like existence in a foreign land, or to be devoured (2011: 
31; see also Widdowson 1977). Such bogeymen narratives are instrumental in people’s 
attempts to ‘name dangers and to draw distinctions between them and us’ (Warner 2011: 
14). We submit, therefore, that the ‘bogeyman’ narrative is salient for our participants, 
9 Obviously, those who subscribe to Islam—like any other religion—cannot be homogenized as ‘one community’. Despite 
belonging to different factions and coming from different nations, however, the vast majority of Muslims do not support terror-
ist groups, their goals or strategies (see, e.g. Pew Research Centre 2007).
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particularly because it contains three intertwined notions, all of which are expressed by 
our participants.
First, there is the repugnant moral standing of the character who tricks or steals 
children and uses them as a tool for their purposes. In the case of our participants’ per-
ceptions of al-Shabaab recruiters, this involves deceit, brainwashing and a ‘bullshit’ or 
manipulative use of Islam. Our participants consistently expressed incredulity toward 
the grinning and sanctimonious promises found in al-Shabaab’s messaging, and, 
equally consistently, they questioned al-Shabaab’s moral status.
Second, as expressed by our participants, those who the bogeyman comes for are 
weak, childlike, vulnerable and helpless—and as such they represent the antithesis of 
the ‘cool’ independent actors that recruiters purport them to be. They are, the ‘naughty 
boys’ for whom the bogeyman comes and to whom the bogeyman narratives serve as a 
cautionary tale (Warner 2011: 33).
The third aspect is less apparent because it does not involve characters within the 
bogeyman narrative per se, but rather works on a different order—at the level of the 
subjectivity of the storyteller him/herself. As we saw, our participants were empow-
ered through their self-positioning, not in the role of the child who is vulnerable to 
the bogeyman, but instead as the storyteller who knows better (‘you don’t know how 
to fight dude’ and ‘have a bigger self-understanding of who you are’). These partici-
pants, because they are able to see through the al-Shabaab recruitment ploys, are able 
to paternalistically warn would-be recruits, using bogeyman-esque narratives, about 
al-Shabaab. In short, irrespective of their knowledge of the Brothers Grimm or Hans 
Christian Andersen, they are authors of the bogeyman theme, and contributors to 
the bogeyman genre and as such they are active creators of narratives that repudiate 
al-Shabaab.
Although on the surface it seems that these narratives are directed outwards, 
toward other, younger more impressionable youth, it is clear that ‘telling the tale’ is 
a form of identity work in terms of self-constitution and self-assurance for the par-
ticipants themselves. In tale-telling about the bogeyman, these subjects can achieve 
‘relief from the terror that the thing itself would inspire if it were to appear for real…. 
[and] discover that they are still alive, outside the tale’ (Warner 2011: 6). The rather 
‘weird sense of humour’ mentioned above that accompanied enactments of running 
away from al-Shabaab recruiters resembles what Warner describes as ‘metamorphic 
humour, which seizes the objects of fear, like beasts, and turns them into something 
different…a widely and successfully adopted stratagem in the confrontation of fear’ 
(2011: 19). If we apply these insights to the present case, we can see that the narrative-
generation of our participants is not merely an incidental by-product of a pre-existing 
resilience against al-Shabaab. Rather, our participants were extricating themselves 
from the story of recruitment to al-Shabaab through the very act of taking command 
of the tale.
Programs like the aforementioned US government ‘Think Again. Turn Away’ cam-
paign already seem to employ the first two elements of the ‘bogeyman’ trope described 
above. This is exemplified in the post from 9 December 2013 depicting Omar Hammami 
(among others) and captioned by the phrase, ‘They came for Jihad but were murdered 
by al-Shabaab (see below). 
FOREIGN FIGHTERS AND AL-SHABAAB
825
 at U
niversity of H
ong K
ong on A
ugust 29, 2016
http://bjc.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
(retrieved from https://twitter.com/ThinkAgain_DOS, 10 December 2013).
And tweets, such as the one below, that invoke the ‘religious bullshit’ frame: 
(retrieved from https://twitter.com/thinkagain_dos, 11 July 2014).
It would seem, however, that current counterterrorism strategies could make better use 
of the third element, which postulates that, to the extent that community members reach 
their own conclusions and take ownership of condemnatory narratives about a group like 
al-Shabaab, the more they will enjoy the empowering aspects of being the ‘teller of the 
tale’. Following from this assertion, public policy makers should seek to establish the pre-
conditions for such self-directed ideation and reposition themselves vis-à-vis the commu-
nities they supposedly want to address with counterterrorism strategies. But the same is 
true for scholars: it seems odd that criminologists and terrorism scholars have spent so 
little attention on what the broad majority of a population has to say about specific ter-
rorist groups—especially when trying to develop specific and targeted policy interven-
tions. This, however, would require a rethinking of theories of radicalization and a greater 
understanding of how narratives interact with subjectivities. Rather than casting certain 
communities and/or second-generation diaspora youth as ‘at risk’, when designing studies 
or writing grant applications, we might do well to view them instead as sources of resilience. 
Indeed, and as our study has shown, most members of the Somali-Canadian diaspora have 
already communally and independently crafted sophisticated and dismissive understand-
ings of groups like al-Shabaab. It is only by asking questions within the Somali diaspora, 
however, that one can begin to learn how, in recent years, powerful counternarratives are 
already contributing to and attending the diminution of support for al-Shabaab.
Conclusion
In his study of radicalization toward suicide terrorism, Scot Atran maintains that the last 
‘line of defense’—intercepting already-radicalized jihadists on their way to targets—is 
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most expensive and the least likely to be successful. Instead, he calls for a ‘first line of 
defense’, which would ‘drastically reduce receptivity of potential recruits to recruiting 
organizations’ (2003: 1538). Our findings suggest that researchers might be able to bet-
ter comport themselves to this task by inverting their attempts to understand processes 
of radicalization. It is not our intention to deny that certain sections of Islamic commu-
nities in the West, including Somalis, have been successful at recruiting Islamic extrem-
ists and fomenting anti-Western sentiment. However, overall, these remain exceedingly 
rare. What we do suggest is that rather than focusing on the small handful of individu-
als who radicalize, we should choose instead to focus on understanding the worldviews 
of the vast majority who do not. John Horgan (2009), in his book Walking Away from 
Terrorism, found that people often leave terrorist groups after becoming disillusioned 
with the realities of life in terrorist movements. Our study does nothing to call this 
assertion into question, but rather tables a complementary claim, suggesting that an 
empowering incredulity towards the mythic elements of terrorist group propaganda 
has strong potential as an ‘upstream’ method of preventing engagement. Our discov-
ery of ‘bogeyman’ narratives within Somali diaspora in Canada suggests that narrative 
criminology is well placed to conceptualize this form of narrative incredulity. In the 
case of al-Shabaab and the Somali diaspora in Toronto, Canada, whatever glorified 
visions may have existed about al-Shabaab have since rung hollow for most youth today, 
and, as Freeze and Freisen (2013) have noted, the ‘Canadian Pipeline to Al-Shabaab 
has Dried Up’. Indeed, it seems that the very qualities that al-Shabaab purports to 
offer recruits (independence, coolness, religious correctness), our participants seize for 
themselves via their storied rejections of al-Shabaab and its wiles.
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